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Abstract: Regional and institutional aspects of local public finances are studied in this paper. Mexican Northern Border 
municipalities have experienced economic and populational growth rates that are much higher than other Mexican regions. 
These heterogenous laws of motion result in higher demand for public services and infrastructure. The different institutional 
framework, both fiscal and legal, faced by municipalities in every Mexican State might impact the fiscal behavior of local 
governments. This article studies whether border municipalities are more financially dependent on central authorities due to the 
high demand for public services in their jurisdictions and their inability to obtain sufficient funding. We estimate several 
econometric models for the more representative 300 Mexican municipalities in the year 2000. We find a strong and negative 
relationship between income and financial dependence, as expected. We also uncover that institutional and regional factors 
should not be omitted in the model specifications. Classic statistical theory, based on the estimations, finally suggests that the 
border Mexican municipalities of Ciudad Juárez and Puerto Peñasco have systematically lower financial dependence than 
others. There is not, however, a general rule regarding border municipalities and financial dependence. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mexican subnational public sector finances underwent major changes during the last 25 years. The 
“Sistema Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal” (SNCF, the National System of Fiscal Coordination), 
established in 1980, increased the amount of non-conditional transfers (“participaciones federales”)  to 
states and municipalities. Subsequently, the Constitutional Reform of Article 115 in 1983 transferred 
fiscal functions and responsibilities to municipal governments. It remains a topic of discussion whether 
the SNCF has increased the degree of financial independence of Mexican subnational governments. One 
would expect the Constitutional Reform to reduce the degree of financial dependence once new sources of 
own revenues become available. In fact, one of the explicit objectives of the Constitutional Reform was to 
reduce financial dependence. 
In addition to changes in fiscal institutions at the national level, the institutional frameworks faced 
by municipalities within their states have changed. These additional forces could also affect the degree of 
financial dependence. Particularly interesting is the case of Mexican Northern border municipalities, 
whose economic, demographic and migratory dynamics contrast with the rest of Mexico. This study 
investigates whether the institutional fiscal setting at the state level, together with location (municipalities 
sharing a common border with the U.S.), impact the financial independence of local governments. We 
expect, with higher than average inflows of capital and labor, higher demand for public services and 
infrastructure in border municipalities. An argument based on fiscal effort suggests that local governments 
would exploit their fiscal capacity to the maximum, lessening their lower degree of financial dependence 
relative to non-border localities. However, border municipalities may be simply more financially 
dependent on central authorities due to the high demand for public services in their jurisdiction and their 
inability to obtain sufficient funding. 
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Concerning the effects of federal institutional changes, Ibarra Salazar et al. (2001) find that after 
1980 the degree of financial dependence of Mexican municipalities is significantly higher than the years 
preceding SNCF. For the northern border municipalities in particular, Ordóñez Barba (1995) finds that the 
Constitutional Reform did exert positive effects on financial autonomy, though not uniformly. In fact, the 
benefits seem to be higher for municipalities with a relatively high stage of urbanization, having a 
population over 250,000 people. Additional studies on the public finances of Mexican northern border 
municipalities include Zepeda Miramontes (1992), Ordóñez Barba (1995), Cabello y Ortiz (1998), and 
Ibarra Salazar (2003), who recently documents that northern state governments show less dependence 
than other Mexican states. 
Studies have hitherto ignored the effects that regional characteristics and different institutional 
settings may have on municipal public finances. This study puts forward such an institutional approach, 
incorporating regional aspects of the U.S.-Mexican border area, in order to analyze these effects on 
financial dependence. Because of the economic dynamics and demographics of the area, as well as 
pressure from migration, border municipalities face a higher demand for public services, compared to 
non-border localities. The main hypothesis of this study is precisely based on this fact. The constraints 
border municipalities face when responding to such an environment are then twofold: the fiscal 
intergovernmental agreement signed in 1980 and the distribution scheme to transfer federal funds that 
ignore border-related characteristics. Given such a scenario, local governments in northern border 
municipalities necessarily exploit their own limited resources in the face of heavy demand for 
infrastructure and public service. Pursuing this reasoning, we would thus expect that the degree of border 
municipalities dependence is lower than non-border municipalities. 
In order to confirm or refute the validity of this conjecture, we estimate different econometric 
models of financial dependence using a data set of the 300 more representative Mexican municipalities, as 
defined by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI) for the year 2000. 
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Each model controls for economic (municipality level-GDP per capita) and fiscal (amount of federal non-
conditional transfers as well as concentration of fiscal revenues in a given municipality) measures, 
together with dummy variables that take into account geographic (sharing the border with the U.S.) and 
institutional (state idiosyncracies) differences. 
This study offers four major contributions. First, it presents empirical evidence, at the local level, 
of regional features that quantitatively affect financial dependence. Second, it quantifies the role of the 
states in introducing systematic (regulatory or due to the state’s economic orientation) components on the 
financial dependence of municipalities. Third, it provides a novel approach, based on classic statistical 
theory, to handle municipality public finances that receive shocks at the national level, through the 
institutional framework, and at the local level, thorough migration and capital flows. We provide evidence 
that these fluctuations are much higher than the ones affecting the nation as a whole. Fourth, the paper 
provides insights and policy implications on a public finance issue which is not exclusive to Mexican 
localities. 
The results confirm two of these hypotheses. We find that institutional and regional factors 
systematically affect differences in the degree of financial dependence. Classic statistical theory, based on 
the estimations, suggests that the border counties of Ciudad Juárez and Puerto Peñasco have 
systematically lower financial dependence than other counties. There is not, however, a consensus 
regarding border municipalities and financial dependence. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent economic background of border 
municipalities. Section 3 provides the empirical methodology and the various models to be estimated, 
while section 4 contains the major results of the paper. Sector 5 summarizes the work and presents policy 
implications. 
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2.  THE BACKGROUND OF BORDER MUNICIPALITIES 
As can be seen in Figure 1, until the early 1980s own source municipality revenues were higher 
than non-conditional federal transfers. Since then, transfers increased to the point of representing a higher 
amount than own source revenues. Particularly, in 1983 the Constitutional Reform brought about a sharp 
change in the trend of own source revenues. Since then, both series follow a very similar trend. 
[Figure 1] 
Studies on municipal public finance agree in that the SNCF has strengthened county finances. It 
has increased revenues [Ortega Lomelín (1994), Cabrero Mendoza (1998)] and it has also led, in the long-
run, to an increase in the degree of dependence on federal transfers as argued by Ortega Lomelín (1994), 
Pérez González (1995), Nickson (1995), Arellano Cadena (1996), Sempere and Sobarzo (1996), Aguilar 
Villanueva (1996), Cabrero Mendoza (1998), García del Castillo (1999), and Cabrero Mendoza and 
Carrera (2000). 
Various studies acknowledge that the northern Mexican border shows more economic dynamism 
than other Mexican regions. It is also perhaps more dynamic than other border regions elsewhere in the 
world as argued by Ganster (1998). Arroyo García (2001) recently points out that, as a result of the 
industrial decentralization started in 1985, there has been a geographic redistribution in growth. Northern 
states in Mexico as a consequence have grown faster. This point has been reinforced by studies such as 
Mendoza Cota and Martínez (1999), Chamboux-Leroux (2001) and Mendoza Cota (2001) on 
agglomeration economies. These studies emphasize that economic openness and more integration with the 
U.S. economy have led employment to grow faster in Mexican border cities.  
Figure 2 illustrates growth in manufacturing employment in border municipalities at more than 
double the national aggregate during 1988-1998. Figure 3 shows the real value of manufacturing 
production growing 2.6 times faster in border municipalities than the national for the same period. 
[Figures 2 and 3] 
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The “maquiladora industry” captures a large part of the employment and production capacity along 
the U.S. - Mexican border. Large flows of foreign direct investment to the northern Mexican region 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s changed the region’s manufacturing industry. This has brought 
about trends towards agglomeration of those manufacturing sectors that typically lean towards global 
manufacturing demand, such as: automotive and electronics. 
High demographic turnover is another feature of Mexican border municipalities. Cruz Piñeiro 
(1990), Corona Vázquez (1991), Guillén López (1996), Ganster (1998), and Marmolejo and León (1998) 
stress that the region has registered much higher population growth than the national figures. As shown in 
Figure 4, the population growth of northern border municipalities is more than twice the national rate over 
the 1990-2000 period. Cruz Piñeiro (1990), Corona Vázquez (1991), Ganster (1998), and Margáin (1999) 
discuss several economic reasons for the causes of these changing demographic patterns. Figure 5 shows 
the percentage of residents in border municipalities (“Municipios Fronterizos”) that were born in other 
state (34%), compared to national figures (18%). 
[Figures 4 and 5] 
The degree of financial dependence is measured by the ratio of resources coming from non-
conditional federal transfers to operational revenue. Mexican municipalities receive two types of federal 
closed transfers: non-conditional (“participaciones federales”) and conditional (“aportaciones federales”).1 
The former are discretional, while the latter are assigned to specific purposes. According to the Fiscal 
Cordination Law (“Ley de Coordinación Fiscal”), the amount transferred to the states is allocated from 
seven funds.2
Federal non-conditional transfers to municipalities must account for at least 20% of the amount 
their respective states receive. However, border or coastal municipalities, where there is transit of 
                                                          
1 Arellano Cadena (1996) presents an historic overview of the allocating non-conditional federal transfers’ schemes. See Ortiz Ruiz (1996) 
for details on calculating the coefficients and Courchene and Díaz Cayeros (2000) for a description of the Mexican system of transfers. 
2 The general fund (“fondo general de participaciones”, FGP), the most important quantitatively, is constituted with 20% of the federal tax 
revenue (“recaudación federal participable”, RFP). The other funds are composed of: federal excise taxes; 1% or RFP by federal user charges 
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exported or imported goods, take part in the 0.136% of federal tax revenue (RFP). Border or coastal 
municipalities involved in oil exports receive 3.17% of the additional charge on oil extraction, excluding 
extra charges. Besides, states must assign 100% of the Municipal Fund (“Fondo de Fomento Municipal”), 
which is constituted by 1% of the federal tax revenues, to the corresponding municipalities. In some 
states, at the discretion of state governments and approved by the local congresses, there are also transfers 
to municipalities from state taxes. The criteria to assign the transfer revenues to counties of each state are 
decided by the local congresses. 
A modification in the Fiscal Coordination Law (“Ley de Coordinación Fiscal”) in 1998 created the 
“aportaciones federales”, conditional transfers to states and municipalities, which are to be applied to 
education, health services, social infraestructure, and public security. These were previously assigned on a 
discretionary basis through a bargaining process. This change reflected the creation of Item 33 of the 
federal budget. Table 1 presents the different transfers received by municipal governments.  
[Table 1] 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
We employ cross-sectional Mexican municipality data for the year 2000. The sample contains the 
300 more representative municipalities according to Mexico’s INEGI. We define a border municipality as 
one in which there is geographical border with the U.S. Application of this criterion yields the following 
14 border municipalities: Mexicali, Tecate and Tijuana in Baja California; Juárez in Chihuahua; Acuña 
and Piedras Negras in Coahuila; Aguaprieta, Caborca, Nogales, Puerto Peñasco and San Luis Río 
Colorado in Sonora; and Matamoros, Reynosa and Río Bravo in Tamaulipas. 
Table 2 contains the description of variables and data sources. Table 3 presents descriptive 
statistics of the series used in the estimations as well as the correlation matrix. The demand-related 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
coordination; the 80% of the real value of subrogated agricultural and cattle taxes; the federal tax on vehicles; the federal tax on new autos; 
and a contingency reserve. 
 7
independent variable used to control for economic differences within counties is per capita border GDP, 
estimated under two different criteria: i) employed population; and ii) income of employed population. In 
the former, GDP of municipality i in state j (YMLij) is calculated multiplying GDP of state j by the 
proportion of employed population in municipality i (POi) in the state (POj): YMLij= 
j
i
j PO
POGDP . This 
procedure, adopted by Sánchez Almanza (2000) and Unikel (1976) assumes that partial labor productivity 
is the same in the municipalities of each state. In order to obtain a proxy for variations in inter-
municipality productivity, we estimate the proportion of income of employed population of municipality i 
in state j. Since income data are presented based on the distribution of employed population by ranges of 
minimum wages, we determine the wage mass of each range by multiplying its class midpoint value by 
the number of persons employed in each range. For municipality i GDP in state j, we estimate (YMij) by 
multiplying GDP in state j by the percent wage mass that municipality i represents in state j (that is, the 
proportion of income of employed population in municipality i (IPOi) to state’s income (IPOj): YMij= 
j
i
j IPO
IPOGDP . This procedure assumes all employed workers in each range have the same wage. In both 
methods, municipality GDP per-capita is calculated by dividing county GDP by its population. Table 3 
shows that municipality GDP estimated with income of employed workers (YM) has more variation than 
estimated GDP through employed workers (YML). Although we estimate the models with both measures 
of local GDP, we report only the results with YM. Note also in table 3 that the average of the dependent 
variable (DEP) is 69.36, with minimum value of 25.50 for Tampico, Tamaulipas, and maximum of 98.73 
for Jonuta in Tabasco. 
[Tables 2 and 3] 
The dependent variable of the empirical model is the degree of municipality financial dependence 
(DEP). Independent variables include the concentration of state tax revenues in a given municipality 
(CONC), the per capita municipality GDP (YM or YML), the amount received as transfers (T) different 
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from “participaciones federales”, and dummy variables that identify border municipalities (DTMF and 
DCMF) and to control for differences in the institutional setting that counties face in their respective 
states (DE).3
Given the high correlation coefficient found between T and CONC (0.58 in Table 3), we estimate 
the empirical models with these independent variables entering individually and not jointly. We consider 
the model with T as the benchmark model. Discussion of the model with CONC is available upon request. 
We expect a negative relationship between DEP and YM: the higher GDP per capita in a municipality, 
ceteris paribus, the higher will be own revenue collection, particularly taxes, which serves to reduce the 
degree of dependence on federal transfers. We also expect municipalities with a high share of local fiscal 
revenues, added at the state level, (CONC) to exhibit a lower degree of dependence. It is difficult to 
envisage, however, an ex-ante clear link between DEP and T since the expenditure price elasticity would 
be crucial.4
The state dummy variables (DE) capture the different institutional settings that municipalities face 
in a given state. Poterba and von Hagen (1999) and Kirchgassner (2001) have shown the effect of 
budgetary institutions on subnational fiscal performance. The rules of the game that local treasury offices 
face are approved largely by local congresses. This would mean that some states distribute, apart from 
federal funds, state revenues to municipalities. The criteria that regulate the allocation of transfers to 
municipalities are also different: 84% of states employ relative population as criterion; 52% refer to 
property tax collection; 45% to a measure of fiscal effort based on local municipality revenues; 42% to 
water usage charges; 39% to equal parts distribution of funds; 29% to revenues from previous fiscal 
                                                          
3 We acknowledge, as an anonymous referee has suggested, that the economic activity generated by migrants should be incorporated in the 
empirical model. We are not aware, however, of such data availability for the 300 municipalities considered in this study. We leave the 
construction of a possible proxy on migration flows and a full assessment on their effects for future work. 
4 Revenue received by means of conditional transfers, other than “participaciones federales,” could affect financial dependence through the 
municipality’s own resources. If, as a consequence of conditional transfers, county expenditures increase by a larger amount than the 
transfer, own resources would have to rise [Stine (1994), p. 804] and municipality dependence would fall. Otherwise, such transfers would 
affect municipality expenditure, without requiring the generation of additional own source revenue. In such a scenario, the local government 
would apply the transfers on the expenditure item for which it was conceived. However, the amount received by the municipality could 
create a disincentive to exploit own revenue sources if federal government takes care of the fiscal needs, moving up the degree of 
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budgets. Other criteria employed are the territorial area of municipalities and social indicators, such as 
welfare and violence [Indetec (2000a and 2000b)]. We believe the DE’s capture differences in financial 
dependence of the municipalities in each state according to this framework. Finally, the identification of 
border municipalities takes two forms: through DTMFij (1 for every municipality i bordering the U.S. in 
state j, and 0 elsewhere) and with the set of variables DCMFij (one variable for each one of the 14 
Mexican municipalities in the sample bordering the U.S.). 
We consider three hypotheses related to municipality financial dependence on the federal entity. 
First, the institutional background is a major factor explaining variations in the degree of dependence of 
Mexican municipalities (DEP): hypothesis H1. Second, controlling for state political and institutional 
related differences, the variables that identify border municipalities with the U.S. contribute to explaining 
variations in DEP: hypothesis H2. Third, controlling for differences in the institutional setting, border 
municipalities have a lower degree of dependence than non-border municipalities, which turns out to be 
hypothesis H3. 
The unrestricted model to test H1, called Model 1, considers the effects of independent variables as 
well as a dummy variable for the institutional setting of each municipality in the state (DEij): 
 
ln (Depij) = βj DEij + θ ln (YMij)+ τ ln (Tij ) + εij, (1) 
 
where: i = 1, ..., 300 represents each municipality in the sample and j = 1, ..., 31 indexes the corresponding 
state, εij is the error term and “ln” indicates the natural logarithm. In model (1) the constant term of the 
counties in state j is equal to βj, although it may be different for municipalities located in a different state. 
Such differences, if any, would suggest effects of institutional settings on financial dependence. If such 
differences in states do not generate different degrees of municipality dependence, then β1 = β2 = ... = β31. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
dependence. Therefore, the effect on the degree of local government dependence would depend, in general, on the reaction to federal 
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These would be the restrictions (J = 31) to test H1 utilizing Model 1 as the benchmark. The J restrictions 
are associated with the population parameters under the null hypothesis. The alternative is that the β’s are 
different. Accordingly, the Restricted Model can be expressed as follows: 
 
ln (Depij) = β + θ ln (YMij) + τ ln (Tij) + εij. (2) 
 
To test H2, we employ the two dummy variables for border municipalities previously defined. The 
unrestricted Model 2 that contains variable DTMFij, considers the independent variables, the state 
dummies, and identifies border municipalities through a single dummy variable, taking the form:  
 
ln (Depij) = βj DEij + δ DTMFij + θ ln (YMij) + τ ln (Tij) + εij, (3) 
 
It assumes that differences in dependence between border and non-border municipalities, 
controlled for the independent variables, are captured by the coefficientsβj and δ. In Model 2 the intercept 
of non-border municipalities located in state j equals βj, while the intercept for the border municipalities 
located in state j equals βj + δ. When δ < 0, there is evidence that dependence on federal transfers of 
border municipalities would be less than dependence of non-border municipalities in the same state. 
However, if there is no difference in the degree of dependence between border and non-border 
municipalities in the same state, δ would equal zero. 
To test whether the degree of dependence of a border municipalities is the same as that of a non-
border municipalities, located in different states, one would need to compare the value of δ + βk of the 
border municipality (in border state k) with βj of the non-border municipality in the non-border state j. 
Denoting by Ω the set of border states and by Θ the set of non-border states, Ω  Θ = Ψ refers to the ∪
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
transfers and, especially, on the expenditure price elasticity. 
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whole set of Mexican state entities. In order to prove this hypothesis, the set of restrictions one would 
need to impose on the population parameters of Model 2 to prove H2 is: δ + βk Ω∈  = βj ∈ Ψ for all k ∈ Ω 
and for all j ∈ Ψ. This could be accomplished restricting δ to be zero and the β parameters to be equal for 
the 31 states. The Restricted Model remains the same as in (2). 
Model 3 defines the unrestricted model with dummy variables to identify each border municipality 
and includes a different intercept for each border municipalities, under the assumption that the parameters 
for the variables YM and T are equal for the municipalities in the sample: 
 
ln (Depij) = βj DEij + δi DCMFij + θ ln (YMij) + τ ln (Tij) + εij. (4) 
 
Following Hsiao (1999) on fixed effects models, DCMFij helps capture the effects of those omitted 
variables in the model that are specific to each border municipality. Although we control for the 
institutional setting at the state level through DE, the variable DCMF could contain information of 
political and institutional nature at the local level that is not included in (4). The political party of the state 
governor and of the county mayor, the composition of local assemblies and local elections are political 
factors that could affect the financial structure of local governments. Fiscal effort5 is another factor that 
could affect the degree of dependence and is not included in the model. Ceteris paribus, if a municipality 
raises the tax rate one would expect that own source revenues would increase and thus that dependence 
would diminish. 
In (4), the intercept of non-border municipalities that belong to state j equals βj, while for the 
border municipality i in state j it would equal βj + δi. The set of restrictions on the parameters of the null 
hypothesis from Model 3 are that δi equals zero for the 14 border municipalities and β1 = β2 = ... = β31.  
                                                          
5 The concept is due to Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) and has been empirically implemented by Badu and Li (1994) and Mercer and 
Gilbert (1996). It is defined as the ratio between revenue generated from taxes and revenue from taxes if the standard tax rate were applied. It 
is thus the ratio between the observed tax rate and the standard tax rate. 
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The set of restrictions on the parameters under the null would be δi + βk ∈ Ω = βj ∈ Ψ for every border 
municipality i belonging to border state k and for all states j. These would indicate that, controlling for 
YM, T (or CONC) and differences in the institutional setting, there is no difference in the degree of 
dependence in each border municipality compared to the rest of municipalities. Introducing these 
restrictions on Model 3 leads to the Restricted Model. 
In order to prove H1 and H2, we construct F = [(SSER – SSEU)/J] / [SSEU/(N-K)], where J is the 
number of restrictions, N is the number of observations, K is the number of parameters to estimate in the 
unrestricted model, SSEU refers to the sum of squared residuals of the unrestricted model and SSER refers 
to the sum of squared residuals of the restricted model. In order to address the more contentious issue 
surrounding H3, we construct the t-statistic, using Model 3, by comparing the degree of dependence of 
each border municipality with all non-border municipalities. The statistic to determine whether financial 
dependence of municipalities i, located in border state k, is less than the financial dependence of 
municipalities located in state j is: 
 
t = 
)ˆˆˆvar(
ˆˆˆ
jki
jki
β−β+δ
β−β+δ
,  (5)  
 
where: var( ) = var( ) + var( ) + var( ) + 2cov( ) – 2cov( ) – 2 cov( ). jki ˆˆˆ β−β+δ iδˆ kβˆ jβˆ ki ˆ,ˆ βδ ji ˆ,ˆ βδ jk ˆ,ˆ ββ
 
4. RESULTS 
We first check the correlation matrix in order to minimize multicolineality problems. Table 3 
shows that CONC and T have high positive correlation (0.58), followed by CONC and YM (0.49). Of 
course, correlation between the two estimated municipality per capita GDP measures (YM and YML) is 
very strong (0.87). We will estimate several models taking into account municipality GDP per capita 
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based on income of employed personel (YM) instead of YML, since the former adjusted better in the sense 
of generating more dispersion in municipality income levels. The qualitative results, however, do not 
change with respect to the income aggregate used. 
Since the error variance of different cross-section units displays heteroscedasticity, we perform the 
estimation with the Newey-West matrix that is robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Table 4 
presents the results of the models with YM and T as independent variables, together with dummy variables 
for the institutional setting and border geographic location as referred to in equations (1) to (4). Model 2 
contains a single dummy variable for all border municipalities (14 in our sample), which turns out not to 
be statistically significant. This shows that the degree of financial dependence of border municipalities is 
not different from those observed in non-border municipalities located in the same state. As expected, the 
degree of financial dependence shares a negative and strong relationship with local income, which is 
observed throughout the models. 
[Table 4] 
It was mentioned ealier (see footnote 4) that the relationship between T and Dep could be either 
positive or negative. The results show that transfers do not help explain the variation in the degree of 
financial dependence of municipalities. This finding may be due to the fact that such transfers do not 
change the municipality expenditures requiring own resources. This remains a topic for further research. 
To address the conjecture that state dummy variables - and therefore the institutional setting - play 
an important role in the extent of municipality financial dependence, we present first a Wald test on all 
parameters of the state dummy variables. We report in line DE (WALD) the result statistic: 81.82 for 
Model 1, 77.34 for Model 2 and 77.25 for Model 3. Each statistic rejects the null hypothesis that all 
parameters of the variables DE are equal. This supports the idea that the institutional setting faced by 
Mexican municipalities in their respective states causes signficant differences with respect to the degree 
of financial dependence. 
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In order to test the second hypothesis for Model 2 in (3) with respect to the Restricted Model in 
(2), we should prove jointly that δ is equal to zero and the parameters of state dummies are equal. Table 4 
reports the F statistic that considers the sum of squared errors for the restricted and unrestricted equations. 
In line “Fcalc.” we report that F = 5.26, which rejects the null at the 1% confidence level (critical values 
are approximately 1.46 and 1.35, respectively). The rejection of the null, consistent with the J-restrictions 
on the parameters being true, implies that the dummy variable to identify border municipalities and the 
state dummies should be present in the model to explain variations in financial dependence within 
Mexican local government units. 
Focusing now on Model 3, which introduces a dummy variable for each border municipality, the 
F-statistic is 4.48. This again rejects the null at the 1% level. This means that the reduction in the sum of 
squared errors from 13.47 in the Restricted Model to 7.50 in Model 3 is statistically significant. Therefore, 
border-region and institutional features are relevant to explain variations in border financial dependence. 
The first two hypotheses of this study are thus confirmed statistically for our cross-section of 300 
representative Mexican municipalities.6
Taking Model 3 as the reference, we calculate the t-statistic in (5) such that we address the more 
controversial hypothesis put forward in this paper: whether border municipalities have a lower degree of 
financial dependence relative to non-border municipalities. Table 5 reports the results for the model.7 Two 
major results appears. First, financial dependence in all border municipalities is lower than municipalities 
located in the state of Campeche, a state typically high on oil related activities and threfore with high 
share of federal transfers. See the very negative t-statistic in the row of that state across all border 
municipalities. Second, financial dependence in the municipalities of Cd. Juárez and Puerto Peñasco is 
much lower than non-border municipalities. However, the same pattern is not found for the remaining 
                                                          
6 We also estimated the empirical model with CONC included as independent variable instead of T. We did not include both in the right hand 
side due to multicolineality. Those estimations suggest that both institutional differences and regional features of border municipalities help 
explain variations in the degree of financial dependence for Mexican logal governments. These are not included to save space and are 
available upon request from the interested reader. 
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border municipalities, which casts doubt on a general rule relating border municipalities to their degree of 
financial dependence. This suggests that the link is more complicated than previously conjectured. The 
dynamics in the region may lead to underachievment of “fiscal discipline” in border municipalities. In this 
case, demand for more public services fueled by the fast growing border population erodes any possible 
effort of fiscal restraint. 
[Table 5] 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Studies on local financial dependence have hitherto ignored the effects that regional characteristics 
and different institutional frameworks may have had on municipality-level public finances. This article 
puts forward an institutional approach combined with regional matters and U.S.-Mexican border features. 
Given the constraints border municipalities face (the 1980 fiscal intergovernmental agreement and the 
distribution scheme of funds ignoring border-related characteristics), local governments in northern border 
municipalities would have to exploit all limited sources of own resources to respond to the heavy demand 
for infrastructure and public services. We would thus expect that the degree of border municipalities 
dependence would be lower than non-border municipalities. 
Our estimates suggest, however, that only the municipalities of Cd. Juárez and Puerto Peñasco 
exhibit a lower degree of financial dependence relatively to non-border municipalities. This casts doubt on 
a generalization regarding border municipalities and the degree of financial dependence, suggesting a 
different mechanism. Less fiscal discipline and more demand for public services by the fast growing 
border population erodes any effort of fiscal restraint. Put differently, the demand effect of new migrants 
to the region overshadows any effort of sound public finance that would have lowered financial 
dependence on federal transfers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
7 The results with the model including CONC are qualitatively the same and and available upon request from the interested reader. 
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Several policy implications may be drawn from this study. Governments in Mexican northern 
border municipalities do require fiscal tools to handle specific shocks to their regions, caused either by a 
sudden reversal of capital inflows or by excess supply of labor through immigration. Apart from federal 
initiatives, such tools have to be approved by local (state and municipal) congresses. The need to amplify 
the fiscal powers of local governments has been discussed in Merino (2001) and Díaz Cayeros and 
McLure (2000). Another implication would be reestructure the distributive criteria of federal transfers to 
capture migratory or other economic impulses of the border region. The negative effect of this option 
would be an increase in financial dependence that might reduce the fiscal effort of municipalities. Besides, 
changing the distributive criteria might cause some municipalities to have the amount of incoming 
transfers fall, which would require compensatory policies for such local entities. 
This study could be extended along several dimensions. Models with political party differences in 
local entities and with fiscal effort measures by Mexican municipalities could be explored. Similarly, the 
effects of conditional transfers on the revenue structure and on financial dependence needs to be further 
explored. It could be particularly interesting to consider what has happened after the creation in 1998 of 
the Federal Budget’s Item 33, known as “aportaciones federales”. These topics are left for further 
research. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aguilar Villanueva L (1996) El Federalismo Mexicano: Funcionamiento y Tareas Pendientes. In 
Hernández Chávez A (ed) ¿Hacia un Nuevo Federalismo?. El Colegio de México y Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, Mexico: 109-152 
Arellano Cadena R (1996) Necesidades de Cambio en las Relaciones Hacendarias Intergubernamentales 
en México. In Arellano Cadena R (ed) México Hacia un Nuevo Federalismo Fiscal. Gobierno del 
Estado de Puebla y Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico: 121-149. 
Arroyo García F (2001) Dinámica del PIB de las Entidades Federativas de México, 1980-1999. Comercio 
Exterior 51 (7): 583-599. 
Badu Y and Li S (1994) Fiscal Stress in Local Government: A Case Study of the Tri-Cities in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. The Review of Black Political Economy 22 (3): 5-17. 
Cabello A and Ortiz E (1998) Finanzas de los Municipios de los Estados de la Frontera Norte de México. 
Revista iapem 4 (40): 80-98. 
 17
Cabrero Mendoza E and Carrera A (2000) Fiscal Decentralisation and Institutional Constraints. Paradoxes 
of the Mexican Case. Documento de Trabajo de la División de Administración Pública del CIDE 
85. 
Cabrero Mendoza E (1998) Las Políticas Descentralizadoras desde el Ambito Regional. Análisis de 
Desequilibrios Regionales, Gasto e Ingreso Público y Relaciones Intergubernamentales (1983-
1993). In Cabrero Mendoza E Las Políticas Descentralizadoras en México (1983-1993). Logros y 
Desencantos. Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas y Miguel Angel Porrúa, Mexico: 
101-187. 
Chamboux-Leroux J (2001) Efectos de la Apertura Comercial en las Regiones y la Localización Industrial 
en México. Comercio Exterior 51 (7): 600-609. 
Corona Vázquez R (1991) Principales Características Demográficas de la Zona Fronteriza del Norte de 
México. Frontera Norte 3 (5): 141-156. 
Courchene T and Díaz Cayeros A (2000) Transfers and the Nature of the Mexican Federation. In Giugale 
M and Webb S (ed) Achievements and Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization: Lessons from 
Mexico. The World Bank, Washington D.C.: 200-236. 
Cruz Piñeiro R (1990) Mercado de Trabajo y Migración en la Frontera Norte: Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez y 
Nuevo Laredo. Frontera Norte  2 (4): 61-93. 
Díaz Cayeros A and McLure C (2000) Tax Assignment. In Giugale M and Webb S (ed) Achievements 
and Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization: Lessons from Mexico. The World Bank, Washington 
D.C.:177-199. 
Ganster P (1998) La Región Fronteriza entre Estados Unidos y México. Border PACT Report: 
http://www.borderpact.org/
García del Castillo R (1999) Los Municipios en México. Los Retos ante el Futuro. Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas y Miguel Angel Porrúa, Mexico. 
Guillén López T (1996) Gobiernos Municipales en México: Entre la Modernización y la Tradición 
Política. El Colegio de la Frontera Norte y Miguel Angel Porrúa, Mexico. 
Hsiao C (1999) Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ibarra Salazar J (2003) Dependencia Financiera en las Participaciones Federales de los Estados 
Fronterizos Mexicanos. Frontera Norte 15: 87-123.  
Ibarra Salazar J, Sandoval Musi A and Sotres Cervantes L (2001) Participaciones Federales y 
Dependencia de los Gobiernos Municipales en México, 1975-1995. Investigación Económica 61 
(237): 25-62. 
Indetec (2000ª) Criterios de Distribución de Participaciones Federales a Municipios de las Entidades 
Federativas para 2000. Revista Hacienda Municipal 72: 66-93. 
Indetec (2000b) Criterios para la Distribución de Participaciones Federales a Municipios por las Entidades 
Federativas para 2000. Revista Hacienda Municipal 73: 84-108. 
Kirchgassner G (2001) The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical 
Evidence. In Winer S and Shibata H (ed) Political Economy and Public Finance. Edward Elgar and 
the International Institute of Public Finance, Cheltenham Northampton: 145-177. 
Margáin E (1999) Globalización y Desarrollo Sustentable en la Frontera de México y Estados Unidos. 
Comercio Exterior 49 (10): 871-877. 
Marmolejo F and León F (1998) La Educación Superior en la Frontera México-Estados Unidos. Border 
PACT Report: http://www.borderpact.org/
Mendoza Cota E (2001) Specialization, Agglomeration and Urban manufacturing Growth in the Northern 
Border Cities of Mexico. Journal of Borderlands Studies 16 (2): 71-83. 
Mendoza Cota E and Martínez G (1999) Globalización y Dinámica Industrial en la Frontera Norte de 
México. Comercio Exterior 49 (9): 795-806. 
 18
Mercer T and Gilbert M (1996) A Financial Condition Index for Nova Scotia Municipalities. Government 
Finance Review October: 36-38. 
Merino G (2001) Federalismo Fiscal: Diagnóstico y Propuestas. Gaceta de Economía Primavera: 145-185. 
Musgrave R and Musgrave P (1980) Public Finance in Theory and Practice. Third Edition McGraw-Hill, 
Tokyo. 
Nickson R (1995) Local Government in Latin America. Lynne Rienner, Boulder. 
Ordóñez Barba G (1995) Finanzas Públicas y Estructura Administrativa: Bases para la descentralización 
de los Municipios Fronterizos del Norte de México. In Pp. In Guillén López T and Ordóñez Barba 
G (ed) El Municipio y el Desarrollo Social de la Frontera Norte. El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 
Mexico: 133-175. 
Ortega Lomelín R (1994) Federalismo y Municipio. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico. 
Ortiz Ruiz M (1996) La Mecánica de la Distribución de Participaciones en Ingresos Federales a los 
Estados y Municipios (Un Ejemplo Numérico). Instituto para el Desarrollo Técnico de las 
Haciendas Públicas, Guadalajara. 
Pérez González H (1995) Estructura de las Haciendas Públicas Municipales. Federalismo y Desarrollo 48: 
54-60. 
Poterba J and von Hagen J (1999) Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Chicago University Press 
and NBER, Chicago. 
Sánchez Almanza A (2000) Marginación e Ingreso en los Municipios de México. Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México y Miguel Angel Porrúa, Mexico. 
Sempere J and Sobarzo H (1996) La Descentralización Fiscal en México: Algunas Propuestas. In Arellano 
Cadena R (ed) México Hacia un Nuevo Federalismo Fiscal. Gobierno del Estado de Puebla y 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico: 165-196. 
Stine W (1994) Is Local Government Revenue Response to Federal Aid Symmetrical? Evidence from 
Pennsylvania County Governments in an Era of Retrenchment. National Tax Journal 47: 799-816. 
Unikel L (1976) El Desarrollo Urbano de México: Diagnóstico e Implicaciones Futuras. El Colegio de 
México, Mexico.  
Zepeda Miramontes E (1992) El Gasto Público en la Frontera Norte. Frontera Norte 4 (7): 5-43. 
 19
Figure 1. MEXICO: Evolution of Own Source Revenues and Non-conditional 
Federal Transfers to Municipalities, 1970-2001. (1994 Million of Mexican Pesos) 
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Source: INEGI. Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales de México. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MEXICO: National and Northern Border Municipalities  
Employment Growth Rates in Manufacturing, 1988-1998. 
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Figure 3. MEXICO: National and Northern Border Municipalities  
Manufacturing Production Real Growth Rate, 1988-1998. 
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Figure 4. MEXICO: National and Northern Border  
Municipalities Population Growth Rate, 1990-2000. 
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Figure 5. MEXICO: Northern Border Municipality Residents that Were  
Born in Other States, 2000. (Percentajes) 
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Source: INEGI. XII Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. MEXICO: Transfers to Municipal Governments 
Source Integration Type 
Revenue-sharing transfers (Participaciones federales) 
received by State government (See footnote 2) 
20% of the amount received 
by states Non-conditional 
Municipal Fund (Fondo de Fomento Municipal) 100% of the amount received by states Non-conditional 
Aportaciones Federales 
The amount is determined in 
the Federal Budget of every 
year. 
Conditional 
Transit of exported or imported goods* 0.136% of federal tax revenues Non-conditional 
Transit of oil exports*  3.17% of the additional charge on oil extraction Non-conditional 
State Taxes Every state decides Non-conditional 
* These are distributed only to the coastal or border municipalities through which such good are imported or exported 
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Table 2. Definitions of Variables and Sources of Information 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Depij
Measures the degree of municipality dependence 
on non-conditional federal transfers. Calculated by 
the ratio between revenue from “participaciones 
federales” to municipality i in state j and its 
operational revenue (taxes, charges, non-
conditional transfers, products, benefits and other 
revenue). 
 
Own construction based on 
INEGI: Finanzas Públicas 
Estatales y Municipales de 
México: Aguascalientes, 
2001. 
CONCij
Measures concentration of fiscal revenue in the 
municipality i of state j. Calculated as the ratio of 
tax revenues in municipality i to the total municipal 
tax revenues in state j.  
 
Own construction based on 
INEGI: Finanzas Públicas 
Estatales y Municipales de 
México: Aguascalientes, 
2001. 
YMij
Denotes the Gross Domestic Product per capita in 
municipality i of state j. It was estimated by 
weighting GDP of state j by the percentage that 
income of employed population in municipality i 
represents with respect to to the total income of 
employed population in state j.  
 
Own construction based on 
INEGI: Sistema de Cuentas 
Nacionales de México en 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx. 
INEGI. XII Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000: 
Aguascalientes, 2001. 
YMLij
Denotes the Gross Domestic Product per capita in 
municipality i of state j. Estimated according to 
Sánchez Almanza (2000) and Unikel (1976), in 
which GDP of state j is multiplied by the percent 
employed population in municipality i with respect 
to employed population in state j. 
 
Own construction based on 
INEGI: Sistema de Cuentas 
Nacionales de México en 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx. 
INEGI. XII Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000: 
Aguascalientes, 2001. 
Tij
Amount received in municipality i of state j by 
concept of transfers different from non-conditional 
federal transfers (“participaciones federales”), 
incluiding or those of the 
 budgetary  item 33. 
 
INEGI: Finanzas Públicas 
Estatales y Municipales de 
México: Aguascalientes, 
2001. 
DTMFij
A dummy variable to consider differences in 
financial dependence across border municipalities. 
It equals 1 if municipality i in state j is in the north 
border and 0 in any other case. Border 
municipalities in our sample are: Mexicali, Tecate 
and Tijuana in Baja California; Juárez in 
Chihuahua; Acuña and Piedras Negras in 
Coahuila; Auguaprieta, Caborca, Nogales, Puerto 
Peñasco and San Luis Río Colorado in Sonora; 
and Matamoros, Reynosa and Río Bravo in 
Tamaulipas. 
 Own construction. 
DCMFij
A set of dummy variables to consider difference in 
dependence of each border municipality. It equals 
1 for each border municipality i in state j and 0 
elsewhere. 
 Own construction. 
DEij
Dummy variable to control for political and 
institutional differences within municipalities of 
each state. It equals 1 if the municipality i belongs 
to state j and 0 elsewhere. 
 Own construction. 
Note: The total of observations corresponds to the 300 municipalities selected by Mexico’s INEGI for the year 
2000. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Average Minimum Maximum Standard Jarque-Bera 
    Deviation [Probability] 
Dep 69.36 25.50 98.73 16.50 
5.90 
[0.052] 
CONC 0.088 0.0003 0.857 0.148 
1089.93 
[0.00] 
YML 44,450 18,027 98,634 18,458 
53.87 
[0.00] 
YM 43,251 8,028 130,121 21,691 
71.21 
[0.00] 
T 52,997,074 2,131,506 3.75E+08 57,305,236 
1432.67 
[0.00] 
     
 
Correlation 
Matrix     
 
 Dep CONC YML YM 
 
T 
 
Dep 1    
 
CONC -0.33 1   
 
YML -0.40 0.27 1  
 
YM -0.57 0.49 0.87 1 
 
T -0.25 0.58 0.13 0.29 
 
1 
Notes: Dep measures financial dependence of municipalities; CONC represents the concentration of fiscal revenue 
generated in the municipality; YML is municipality GDP per capita, calculated based on employed population; YM is 
municipality GDP per capita, calculated based on the wage of employed population; and T measures the amount of 
conditional transfers, different from federal transfers. The “Jarque-Bera” statistics measure normality of the series. Its null 
hypothesis is of a normal distribution and its “p-value” is reported below the statistic (n = 300 observations). See Table 2 
for further data description. 
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Table 4.  Parameter Estimates of Model Coefficients. 
 
 Border County Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Restricted Model
C      
   7.46*** 
(0.36) 
log (YM) 
  
  -0.39*** 
(0.03) 
   -0.39*** 
(0.03) 
   -0.38*** 
(0.03) 
  -0.30*** 
(0.03) 
log (T) 
  
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.02) 
DCMF1 Mexicali  
  0.37* (0.20)  
DCMF2 Tecate 
  0.25 (0.20)  
DCMF3 Tijuana 
  0.40** (0.20)  
DCMF4 Ciudad Juárez 
  -0.48*** (0.05)  
DCMF5 Acuña 
  0.04 (0.08)  
DCMF6 Piedras Negras 
  0.22*** (0.08)  
DCMF7 Agua Prieta 
  0.04** (0.02)  
DCMF8 Caborca 
  -0.06*** (0.02)  
DCMF9 Nogales 
  0.22*** (0.02)  
DCMF10 Puerto Peñasco 
  -0.51*** (0.03)  
DCMF11 S.L. Río Colorado 
  0.17*** (0.02)  
DCMF12 Matamoros 
  0.19* (0.11)  
DCMF13 Reynosa 
  0.08 (0.11)  
DCMF14 Río Bravo 
  0.06 (0.11)  
DTMF  No 0.04 (0.09) No No 
DE (WALD)  81.82***          [0.00] 
      77.34*** 
[0.00] 
     77.25*** 
[0.00] No DE’s 
SSE  8.27 8.25 7.50 13.48 
Fcalc       5.42***       5.26***      4.48***  
Adj. R2  0.55 0.55 0.57 0.34 
D.W.  2.11 2.11 1.98 1.47 
Notes: The variables are defined in Table 2. Fcalc = [(SSER – SSEU)/J] / [SSEU / (N-K)], where SSEU represents the sum of 
squared errors of the unrestricted model; SSER represents the sum of squared errors of the restricted model; J are the 
restrictions; N is the number of observations, and K is the number of estimated parameters in the unrestricted model. The 
Fcalc statistic is compared with the F distribution with [J, (N-K)] degrees of freedom. We denote ***, **, and * to rejection 
of H0 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. DE (WALD) means the hypothesis test on all DE’s being equal. The standard 
deviations are computed by the Newey-West variance-covariance matrix. The 31 estimated parameters of the state dummy 
variables (DE) for Models 1 to 3 are not presented due to space constraints. 
Table 5. Statistics on the Degree of Financial Dependence of Border Municipalities Against No-Border Municipalities. 
      Baja California Chihuahua Coahuila Sonora Tamaulipas
    Ciudad  Piedras Agua Puerto San Luis Río
Mexicali        Tecate Tijuana Juárez Acuña Negras Prieta Caborca Nogales Peñasco Río Colorado Matamoros Reynosa Bravo
Aguascalientes    -4.46 -8.22 -3.37 -13.35 -2.16 3.58 -1.72 -4.93 3.69 -15.47  2.15 2.08 -1.22 -2.00
Baja California 1.85 1.29 1.98 0.00 2.33 3.25 2.40 1.88 3.27 -0.39 3.01 3.00 2.46 2.40
Baja California Sur -0.13 -1.21 0.13 -3.41 0.71 2.42 0.83 -0.12 2.46 -4.24 1.98 1.93 0.96 0.81
Campeche   -14.21 -20.41 -12.44 -22.36 -14.62 -8.49 -13.66 -16.97 -8.32 -27.06 -10.09 -8.66 -11.60 -12.60
Chihuahua  -2.26 -4.59 -1.57 -9.58 -0.32 3.62 -0.05 -2.22 3.71 -10.38 2.64 2.69 0.31 -0.08
Chiapas -1.04   -2.92 -0.47 -7.73 0.65 3.92 0.86 -0.93 3.98 -7.84 3.13 3.41 1.30 0.99
Coahuila   -0.69 -2.07 -0.31 -5.38 0.48 2.80 0.63 -0.64 2.85 -5.86 2.21 2.26 0.88 0.65
Colima   -1.49 -5.71 -0.73 -9.33 0.92 6.59 1.33 -1.98 6.68 -14.87 5.12 4.32 1.49 1.22
Durango   -4.02 -7.13 -2.50 -16.37 -0.24 6.84 0.22 -3.48 6.91 -14.27 5.23 6.46 1.11 0.30
Guerrero  1.79 -0.06 2.20 -3.96 3.41 6.43 3.63 1.93 6.47 -5.29 5.69 5.75 3.91 3.91
Guanajuato  4.40 1.44 4.88 -4.12 6.06 10.00 6.24 4.13 9.97 -4.86 9.19 10.94 8.01 8.74
Hidalgo  1.32 -1.55 1.93 -7.27 3.71 8.34 3.97 1.41 8.36 -8.52 7.28 7.80 4.76 4.94
Jalisco  3.90 1.40 4.31 -4.10 6.55 10.97 6.80 4.36 10.98 -5.93 9.91 9.79 7.10 7.44
México 2.86 -0.27 3.48 -6.68 4.83 9.30 5.00 2.62 9.29 -6.84 8.38 10.30 6.90 7.39
Michoacán  3.75 1.61 4.16 -2.74 5.26 8.44 5.41 3.69 8.47 -3.71 7.70 8.17 6.15 6.11
Morelia   -3.25 -8.06 -1.92 -14.33 0.13 8.07 0.65 -3.73 8.10 -16.31 6.25 6.36 1.42 0.90
Nayarit  0.86 -0.32 1.15 -2.89 1.79 3.65 1.91 0.88 3.69 -3.56 3.19 3.24 2.13 1.99
Nuevo León   -2.62 -5.39 -1.76 -11.83 -0.22 4.92 0.12 -2.49 5.08 -12.08 3.62 3.42 0.57 0.09
Oaxaca  1.12 -1.96 1.82 -8.28 3.69 8.79 3.92 1.18 8.82 -9.15 7.63 8.18 4.87 4.81
Puebla  1.51 -3.00 2.11 -7.93 6.84 14.49 7.69 2.76 14.38 -15.46 12.46 9.54 5.72 7.20
Querétaro   -2.22 -7.60 -1.03 -12.97 1.36 9.46 1.89 -2.85 9.39 -16.51 7.67 7.61 2.58 3.19
Quintana Roo 0.03 -1.09 0.32 -3.51 0.93 2.72 1.05 0.05 2.76 -4.21 2.27 2.27 1.22 1.06 
San Luis Potosí -3.59 -6.03 -2.57 -13.02 -0.86 4.09 -0.51 -3.24 4.17 -12.21 2.90 3.36 -0.09 -0.72
Sinaloa 2.59 -0.62 3.19 -7.04 5.01 9.87 5.25 2.59 9.82 -7.82 8.85 10.55 6.88 8.13
Sonora -2.77 -8.29 -1.24 -15.47 1.61 11.68 2.11 -3.21 11.55 -16.89 9.64 10.11 3.37 4.20
Tabasco -4.12 -6.79 -3.15 -12.27 -1.74 2.89 -1.41 -4.13 2.96 -12.90 1.76 2.02 -1.14 -2.19
Tamaulipas -0.35 -1.46 -0.09 -3.57 0.48 2.18 0.60 -0.35 2.22 -4.54 1.75 1.71 0.74 0.60
Tlaxcala -3.84 -9.02 -2.82 -11.69 -1.98 3.90 -1.62 -5.33 3.96 -17.53 2.47 2.30 -0.89 -2.10
Veracruz -4.60 -7.23 -3.30 -15.19 -1.37 4.45 -0.92 -4.12 4.53 -13.77 3.06 3.67 -0.55 -1.42
Yucatán -4.94 -8.36 -3.39 -16.88 -1.36 6.04 -0.80 -4.61 6.17 -15.64 4.28 4.60 -0.23 -1.07
Zacatecas 1.77 -0.79 2.30 -5.94 3.83 7.80 4.10 1.87 7.79 -7.16 6.90 7.62 4.90 5.38
Note: The statistic tests the null δi + βk = βj against the alternative δi + βk < βj for border municipality i in border state k. It is calculated by t=
)ˆˆˆvar(
ˆˆˆ
jki
jki
β−β+δ
β−β+δ
. 
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